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Introduction
After the military defeat of the Mouvement du 
23 mars (M23, March 23 Movement) rebellion 
in November 2013, armed mobilization in the 
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has 
continued at a frightening pace. An initial, much-
advertized wave of surrenders did not persist, and 
consisted mostly of individual combatants rather 
than armed groups as a whole. During the course 
of 2014, the armed group landscape underwent 
further fragmentation, as existing groups split 
and new ones emerged. A recent count identifies 
more than seventy groups in the Kivu provinces 
alone.1 Most of these groups—such as the various 
Raia Mutomboki and Nyatura factions—are not 
larger-scale rebel movements. They have a limited, 
although variable, number of fighters, often less 
than 300. What explains this proliferation of 
smaller-scale armed groups in the eastern Congo? 
What policies have been adopted to address this 
situation? And finally, what are the implications for 
efforts towards stabilization and peacebuilding? 
This briefing identifies the main processes 
underlying the proliferation of armed groups in 
the eastern Congo. It argues that, paradoxically, 
the very policies adopted to tackle armed groups 
have become a source of their proliferation. This 
includes military operations, which have recently 
emerged as the main strategy of stabilization. 
Therefore, there is a need to develop alternative 
policies that not only aim to convince armed 
groups to lay down their arms, but also address 
their wider political and economic support 
networks. 
Explaining armed group proliferation
The recent emergence of a multitude of smaller 
armed groups can be explained by the interplay 
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between three processes.2 First, the growing 
involvement of lower-level political actors in armed 
mobilization, amounting to the ‘democratization’ 
of militarized politics; second, the continuing 
volatility of local conflict dynamics; and third, 
counterproductive military policies. 
The ‘democratization’ of militarized politics
In the first decade after the Second Congo War 
(1998–2003), the decisive impetus for renewed 
armed mobilization was primarily given by national 
and provincial elites, sometimes connected to 
regional actors.3 Discontent with post-settlement 
developments—often related to diminishing power, 
status and income—led numerous military leaders 
and allied politicians and businesspersons either 
to refuse to lay down their arms or to establish 
new armed groups. At the same time, claiming 
to represent the communities from which they 
originated, these politico-military entrepreneurs 
voiced unaddressed grievances, such as ongoing 
insecurity and conflicts around territory, identity, 
local authority and resources. Due to the linkages 
between inter-elite competition on the one hand, 
and conflicts between and within communities on 
the other, the armed mobilization of one group 
often stimulated the mobilization of others, which 
feared finding itself at a comparative disadvantage. 
The logic here is comparable to that of the security 
dilemma, whereby groups and elites reinforce their 
military position when they feel threatened or 
overtaken by others. 
Liaising with armed groups yields numerous 
advantages for political actors. First, it reinforces 
their power within their local constituencies. Not 
only does it enhance their influence over local 
authorities, it also provides an edge in conflicts 
and in electoral and economic competition. 
Furthermore, maintaining contacts to armed 
groups allows political actors to increase their 
popular support, especially where armed groups 
are seen to safeguard communities’ interests and 
security. An enhanced local power position may in 
turn translate into increased access to provincial 
and national power circles. By having leverage over 
armed groups and being able to mobilize local 
followers, politicians and businesspersons become 
people to reckon with. Therefore, those in power 
are pushed to co-opt these groups in order to avoid 
their causing insecurity and acting against their 
interests. 
In recent years, however, the usefulness of 
liaising with armed groups seems to have 
gradually diminished—at least within the national 
political arena. It is no longer a shortcut to high-
level positions in the politico-administrative 
apparatus or security services. Nevertheless, at 
the provincial and local level, manipulating armed 
groups continues to yield results. Therefore, 
an ever-wider array of political actors adopts 
this strategy, a process that may be described 
as the ‘democratization’ of militarized politics. 
Increasingly, armed group activity is nourished by 
powerful customary chiefs, other local authorities, 
provincial ministers and parliamentarians, so 
called candidats malheureux (electoral candidates 
who fail to obtain sufficient votes), medium-size 
businesspersons, and mid-level commanders. 
The ‘democratization’ of militarized politics 
points to the relative weakness of the political 
centre—Kinshasa is unable to control the myriad 
competing power networks straddling the country. 
At the same time, it has limited incentives to 
do so, as political fragmentation pre-empts and 
reduces threats to the regime. Furthermore, the 
connections between national elites and their 
grassroots support basis are sometimes weak. 
The result is widening space for lower-level 
politico-military entrepreneurs, and sometimes 
the splintering of armed groups, as commanders 
deprived of the authority and resources gained 
from national elites fail to maintain local 
coherence. 
Persistent impunity further feeds into this 
widening space. Few of the armed group leaders 
responsible for grave human rights violations have 
been held accountable. Similarly, the political and 
economic networks supporting armed groups 
have been able to operate relatively undisturbed, 
creating the impression that the risks associated 
with involvement in armed activity are low. 
Finally, local conflicts have remained volatile, 
creating further opportunities for politico-military 
entrepreneurs to reinforce their power position.
The volatility of local conflict dynamics
Over the past two decades, there has been limited 
progress with defusing local conflict dynamics in 
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the eastern Congo.4 Thus, a multitude of conflicts, 
often related to local authority, identity and access 
to land and other natural resources, continues to 
create volatility. At the same time, the capacity for 
regulating conflicts has not significantly improved. 
Existing regulatory and legal frameworks are 
ambiguous, not applied, or poorly harmonized. 
Moreover, the capacity of civilian authorities in 
law enforcement is undermined by both military 
strongmen and feeble legitimacy. Donor-funded 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms have 
not been able to compensate for this, and to solve 
cases blocked by elite interests and armed actor 
involvement.  
Conflict dynamics feed into armed mobilization 
initiated or supported by local political actors, 
providing incentives and justifications for people 
to take up arms. Armed groups, for their part, 
try to seize upon and inflate these conflicts to 
mobilize popular and elite support, often claiming 
to represent the interests of a certain conflict party 
and their wider networks. These processes lead 
to a profound militarization of dispute settling, 
making conflicts ever harder to resolve. Where 
one party in a dispute makes use of armed actors 
to reinforce its position, competitors will feel 
pressure to follow suit. Due to the multitude of 
armed actors that may be present within the same 
area—whether other armed groups or army units—
it is often not difficult to find armed allies. The 
result is a complex interplay between the presence 
of multiple armed factions and the presence of 
multiple local conflicts, in which local politico-
military entrepreneurs are the lynchpin. 
Counterproductive military policies
The policies that have been adopted up to now 
to address armed groups have not been able to 
stem their proliferation. In fact, they have been 
counterproductive. Previously, one of the main 
ways in which Congolese armed groups were 
convinced to lay down arms was through their 
negotiated integration into the Forces armées de la 
République démocratique du Congo (FARDC, Armed 
Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo). 
Government representatives, often FARDC 
officers and politicians, would start secretive 
negotiations with armed group leaderships on the 
terms of their integration. These mostly related 
to ranks and positions in the FARDC, unknown 
amounts of cash and other informal payoffs, and 
in certain cases, guarantees that troops would not 
be redeployed far from their former strongholds. 
Where armed groups had political agendas, 
promises were sometimes made to address political 
demands, although these were not always listed in 
signed agreements. Furthermore, such demands 
were often not fully realized, leading to mutual 
accusations that the terms of the agreement had 
been violated. 
Promising armed group leaders high ranks and 
positions—and granting them impunity for past 
crimes—created incentives for others to take up 
arms. Moreover, integrated officers sometimes 
deserted again when they judged payoffs to 
be disappointing, feared prosecution, or when 
pressure was raised to redeploy them far from 
their former strongholds. In other cases, only the 
main armed group leaders integrated into the 
army, leaving troops behind who continued under 
different commanders. Therefore, the policy of 
negotiations and army integration rarely managed 
to put a definite end to armed groups. Instead, it 
created a vicious circle whereby expected peace 
dividends skewed incentive structures in favour 
of armed mobilization. Additionally, it weakened 
the army, creating parallel command chains and 
divided loyalties. In sum, it stimulated rather than 
stemmed armed group proliferation.5
One of the reasons for the limited success of rebel 
integration was that it mostly played into the 
individual ambitions of armed group leaders. The 
political and economic actors supporting them and 
the rest of the armed group were generally not 
included—notably mid-level command and rank 
and file. Thus, their grievances and interests were 
left unaddressed. This often prompted second-tier 
leaders to return to the bush, especially where 
groups had limited internal cohesion. 
Communities were similarly ignored in integration 
processes, and only limited provisions were made 
to help them come to terms with their violent 
past and complex connections to armed groups. 
Addressing grassroots dynamics was often also 
hampered by the continuing presence of a part 
of the integrated group, the arrival of a different 
armed group, or rampant insecurity resulting from 
the FARDC’s failure to establish effective control 
and protect the population.
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Aside from military integration, military 
operations constituted another strategy to address 
armed groups—one increasingly applied from 
2009 onwards. Although these operations have 
occasionally weakened individual groups, they have 
done little to stem overall armed mobilization. 
This is exemplified by three successive military 
operations conducted from 2009  to 2012: Umoja 
Wetu (‘Our Unity’), Kimia (‘Silence’) II, and Amani 
Leo (‘Peace Today’). These operations dislodged 
and dispersed some of the bigger rebel movements 
that used to be dominant within their strongholds, 
notably the Rwandan-led Forces démocratiques de 
libération du Rwanda (FDLR, Democratic Liberation 
Forces of Rwanda). Others disappeared due to 
army integration—including the Congrès national 
pour la défense du peuple (CNDP, National Congress 
for the Defence of the People) and the Coalition 
des patriotes résistants congolais (PARECO, Alliance 
of Resistant Congolese Patriots).6 The areas 
formerly controlled by these groups have been 
subject to profound fragmentation. The FARDC 
did not manage effectively to occupy and secure 
these zones, leaving the population exposed to 
retaliatory attacks and plunder. This created space 
of movement for other armed groups and was seen 
to justify renewed mobilization for ‘self-defence’, 
in particular in areas with strong local conflict 
dynamics.
Many of those re-initiating armed mobilization 
were deserting FARDC officers who had previously 
served in rebel groups, acting in tandem with 
local authorities. These deserters were commonly 
not top ex-rebel leaders, but officers in mid-
level positions who felt marginalized due to the 
dominance of certain power factions in the army 
formed along ethnic lines. This dynamic was 
strongly manifested during a 2011 army reform 
process called regimentation, when scores of 
officers who had been left out in the allocation of 
command positions deserted. 
The electoral process in 2011 created a further 
impetus for armed group mobilization, as electoral 
candidates harnessed armed groups and engaged 
in ethnic outbidding to gain votes.7 This was 
combined with a slump and intensifying tensions 
in the artisanal mining sector—a key engine of the 
eastern Congo’s economy—due to plummeting 
commodity prices, the encroachment of industrial 
mining, and a changing regulatory framework.8 
These various processes together set in motion 
a self-enforcing momentum of fragmentation. 
A growing number of small-scale armed groups 
reinforced insecurity and aggravated local conflicts, 
which in turn fed into new mobilization—including 
through splits of existing armed groups—and the 
further militarization of local conflicts. 
Despite the limited success of military operations 
in stemming armed mobilization, the government 
has vigorously continued to pursue them. 
Confronted with a number of failed negotiation 
and integration processes during 2012 and 2013, the 
Kinshasa government decided to end the wholesale 
integration of armed groups into the FARDC. 
Rebel combatants can now still be integrated 
into the military, but on an individual basis and 
after completing training at the military bases of 
Kamina or Kitona. Those wanting to return to 
civilian life can, hypothetically, pass through a new 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
(DDR) programme, which was announced in 
December 2013. As the government failed, however, 
to mobilize the required funding and set up 
organizational structures, the plan has been slow 
to start.9 Meanwhile, the Sokola (‘Clean Up’) I and 
II operations, launched in 2014 and 2015 against 
the foreign rebel movements FDLR and the Allied 
Democratic Forces, have created further volatility 
and fragmentation, not least as these groups are 
deeply embedded in local politics.10
Policy implications
The presence of a multitude of armed groups in 
the eastern Congo, which compete and collude in 
ever-shifting constellations, has created profound 
instability. For one thing it has complicated the 
identification of perpetrators. In some contexts, 
it has become increasingly difficult to ascribe 
atrocities and abuses to particular groups. This 
creates a climate of impunity and uncertainty. 
For another, populations are increasingly caught 
between competing armed factions, being accused 
of—and punished for—collaborating with one 
group or the other.
Furthermore, in severely fragmented contexts, any 
event affecting conflict dynamics and local power 
constellations, such as military operations, sets in 
motion chain reactions that can easily spiral out of 
control. Due to the presence of numerous inter-
locking security dilemmas, the strengthening or 
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weakening of one faction may invite competitors 
to demonstrate their strength. This has deep 
implications for military operations. These 
commonly target one specific group only, and rarely 
lead the FARDC to establish effective control and 
security. Therefore, they often merely shake the 
kaleidoscope of armed groups, without diminishing 
their overall number or influence. 
While military operations, as currently conducted, 
seem ineffective in this context of hyper-
fragmentation, it is not easy to envisage what 
non-military interventions may work. The revised 
International Security and Stabilization Support 
Strategy, also known as I4S, puts a strong emphasis 
on community dialogue and local peacebuilding. 
Yet, unscrupulous politico-military entrepreneurs 
often hinder the resolution of local conflicts, 
harnessing them for their own interests. Time 
and again, armed groups and allied elites have 
torpedoed efforts at dialogue and reconciliation, 
for instance by presenting xenophobic opinions as 
community grievances. Furthermore, initiatives to 
address local conflict dynamics have sometimes 
been ill-conceived, being grounded in feeble 
analysis and failing to address the links between 
communities, armed groups, and hard-line elites. 
Also, given that in certain cases local conflicts 
feed armed group mobilization only indirectly, 
defusing them might not end armed group activity 
immediately, although it is a precondition for 
stability in the long term. 
In sum, addressing armed group proliferation 
in the eastern Congo is challenging, and will be 
a long-term process. A first step, both for the 
Congolese government and international actors, 
could be to devise new policies specifically focusing 
on armed groups themselves. Beyond relatively 
ad hoc military operations, there is currently no 
comprehensive policy in place to convince armed 
groups to lay down arms. For those willing to 
negotiate their surrender, it remains unclear what 
conditions and prospects they will be offered. 
There are also limited efforts to tackle the 
political and economic elites who nourish armed 
mobilization—whether by holding them directly 
accountable, hampering their operations, or 
convincing them to change their conduct through 
social and moral pressure. Yet any efforts to 
address armed mobilization that do not engage this 
group are not likely to be sustainable. 
Another process that is indispensable to ensure 
stability in the long term is army reform. Army 
deserters have played a key role in establishing 
new armed groups, which suggests a need to 
improve service conditions and better regulate the 
distribution of ranks and positions. Furthermore, 
without trust in the neutrality and protective 
capabilities of the army, populations will tend 
to support armed groups, if only as a last line of 
defence.
While less visible than bigger rebel movements—at 
least from an international point of view—smaller 
armed groups are a key source of insecurity and 
volatility. Not addressing these groups is likely 
to reduce any chance of improving the eastern 
Congo’s dire security climate. Unfortunately, 
the government and international actors are at 
present mostly focused on the erratic electoral 
and decentralization processes under way. Since, 
in the current context of political and military 
fragmentation, these processes bode only further 
volatility, refocusing attention on armed groups 
seems essential.   
6 RIFT	VALLEY	INSTITUTE	BRIEFING	•	DECEMBER	2015
Credits 
This briefing was edited by Victoria Khroudina. Cover image: © MONUSCO/Sylvain Liechti.
This document is an output from the Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP), funded by the UK Aid from the UK Department 
for International Development (DFID) for the benefit of developing countries. However, the views expressed and information contained 
in it are not necessarily those of or endorsed by DFID, which can accept no responsibility for such views or information or for any reliance 
placed on them. It is available for free download from www.riftvalley.net and www.politicalsettlements.org.
The Rift Valley Institute works in Eastern and Central Africa to bring local knowledge to bear on social, political and economic development.
Copyright © Rift Valley Institute 2015. This work is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License 
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Notes 
1 Jason	Stearns	and	Christoph	Vogel,	‘The	Landscape	of	
Armed	Groups	in	Eastern	Congo’,	Congo	Research	Group,	
Center	on	International	Cooperation,	December	2015.	(http://
congoresearchgroup.org/essay-the-landscape-of-armed-groups-in-
eastern-congo-2/)
2 For	a	more	extensive	discussion	on	the	processes	underlying	
armed	group	mobilization,	see	Jason	Stearns,	Judith	Verweijen,	
and	Maria	Eriksson	Baaz,	The National Army and Armed Groups 
in the Eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian Knot of Insecurity, 
London:	Rift	Valley	Institute,	2013.	(http://riftvalley.net/publication/
national-army-and-armed-groups-eastern-congo)	
3 Jason	Stearns,	‘Causality	and	Conflict:	Tracing	the	Origins	of	
Armed	Groups	in	the	Eastern	Congo’,	Peacebuilding	2/2	(2014):	
157–71.
4 Séverine	Autesserre,	The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence 
and the Failure of International Peacebuilding,	Cambridge:	
Cambridge	University	Press,	2010.
5 Maria	Eriksson	Baaz	and	Judith	Verweijen,	‘The	Volatility	of	a	
Half-cooked	Bouillabaisse:	Reflections	on	Rebel-military	Integration	
and	Conflict	Dynamics	in	Eastern	DRC’,	African Affairs	112/449	
(2013):	563–82.
6 On	the	CNDP,	see	Jason	Stearns,	From CNDP to M23: The 
Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo, London:	Rift	
Valley	Institute,	2012	(http://riftvalley.net/publication/cndp-m23);	
on	the	disintegration	of	PARECO,	see	Jason	Stearns,	PARECO: Land, 
Local Strongmen and the Roots of Militia Politics in North Kivu, 
London:	Rift	Valley	Institute,	2013.	(http://riftvalley.net/publication/
pareco)	
7 Stearns	et	al.,	The National Army and Armed Groups in the 
Eastern Congo.
8 Jeroen	Cuvelier,	Steven	Van	Bockstael,	Koen	Vlassenroot	and	
Claude	Iguma,	‘Analyzing	the	Impact	of	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	on	
Congolese	Livelihoods’, prepared	for	the	DRC	Affinity	Group,	New	
York:	Social	Science	Research	Council,	2014.	(https://s3.amazonaws.
com/ssrc-cdn1/crmuploads/new_publication_3/%7B57858126-EF65-
E411-9403-005056AB4B80%7D.pdf)	
9 Christoph	Vogel,	‘Congo’s	Immobilized	Demobilization	Plan’,	
christophvogel.net, 12	November	2014.	(http://christophvogel.
net/2014/11/12/congos-immobilised-demobilisation-programme/)
10 UN	Group	of	Experts	on	the	DR	Congo,	S/2015/797,	‘Mid-Term	
Report	of	the	Group	of	Experts	on	the	Democratic	Republic	of	the	
Congo’,	16	October	2015.	(http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/
cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_797.
pdf)
